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PARTIES 
Plaintiff in the lower Court proceeding was Johnny Haig. 
Defendant was Orrice McShane. Defendant, McShane third-party 
complained against Ronald Davey, third-party defendant, not 
a party to this appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues raised by this Appellant on appeal are as follows: 
1. The statute upon which plaintiff relied, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 7-15-1(1), as applied to this defendant, Orrice McShane, 
is unconstitutional under the facts of this case, and denies this 
defendant an opportunity of substantive and procedural due process 
of the law. 
2. The trial Court erred by failing to recognize that portion of 
the holding in Hovel Is,, Inc. v Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, (1977), in 
which the facts of that case, and as directly on point with the 
facts of this case, take the instrument, or, in this case, check, 
out of the purview of the statute upon which plaintiff relies. 
3. The trial Court erred by granting an award of attorney's 
fees to plaintiff in that the Order for Partial Summary 
Judgment was inappropriate under the facts of this case, and 
an award of attorney's fees was therefore inappropriate. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
The only material facts of record in this appeal are 
found in the Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff's 
Motion For Summary Judgment and in Defendant's Memorandum 
Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Defendant's Opposition 
To Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. Those 
facts are as follows: 
Defendant/Appellant, (hereinafter referred to as Appellant), 
Orrice McShane, was an officer of the Jay Welch Chorale 
Corporation, also known as the Musical Arts Society, volunteering 
his time, without pay, to the corporation at the time of the 
events of which the Plaintiff/Respondent, (hereinafter referred 
to as Respondent) complained. The third-party defendant in 
the action below, Ronald Davey, was the paid General Manager 
of the Jay Welch Chorale Corporation. 
The Jay Welch Chorale Corporation contracted with the 
Respondent's orchestra to provide the backup music for a 
concert of the Jay Welch Chorale Corporation to be performed 
in Las Vegas, Nevada, in December of 1982. Ronald Davey, as 
General Manager of the Jay Welch Chorale Corporation, promised, 
in behalf of the Jay Welch Chorale Corporation, to pay the 
Johnny Haig Orchestra, said promise being to pay for the 
Orchestra's services at sometime in the future. 
A corporate check was issued to Johnny Haig upon the specific 
condition and agreement by Johnny Haig and Ronald Davey, that 
the check not be presented for payment until it could be paid 
at a time in the future, said time being uncertain. 
The corporate check given to Johnny Haig by Ronald Davey, 
General Manager of the Jay Welch Chorale Corporation, required 
two (2) signatures of officers of the corporation to be valid. 
It was undisputed that both signatories, i.e., Ronald Davey 
and Appellant signed the corporate check, and did so in their 
capacities as corporate officers. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that his due process rights have been 
violated by the interpretation of the statute relied upon by 
Respondent, in that the statutory presumption of liability 
to anyone signing an instrument denies Appellant the right 
to defend against the imposition of such liability by not 
allowing Appellant to present facts which preclude liability 
from accruing against Appellant. 
Further, Appellant is denied the ability to argue facts 
and law, as stated by this Court, which place Appellant out-
side of the purview of the statute relied upon by the Respondent. 
The Appellant also argues that since the lower Court 
erred in granting partial summary judgment against Appellant, 
it also erred in awarding Respondent his attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The statute relied upon by Respondent, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 7-15-1(1) is a statute which presents a statutory 
presumption that anyone signing an instrument, in this case 
a check, which is presented for payment and is dishonored, is 
held liable to the holder, regardless of the facts or 
circumstances of any individual case. The statute above 
cited purports to be a strict liability statute. However, 
the statute makes no distinction among signors. In this case 
the check was a corporate check requiring two (2) signatures 
of corporate officers, the check was given with the explicit 
instruction to Respondent, acknowledged by Respondent that 
such check would not be good until some time in the future. 
In 1977 this Honorable Court in Howells, Inc. v Nelson, 
565 P.2d 1147, (1977) stated: 
The law is that where the maker and 
payee are aware that there are not 
funds presently available to pay a 
check and it it therefore post dated, 
or agreed to be held, it does not come 
within the definition of a check, which 
must be payable upon demand, but is 
properly regarded as a promise to pay 
in the future. (Nelson at 114 9-50; see 
also, State v Bruce, 262 P.2d 960). 
(Emphasis added). 
There are no new cases contradicting the Nclaon case 
with respect to the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 7-15-1(1). The current Section 7-15-1(1) in the Utah 
Code Annotated was enacted by the Utah State Legislature in 
Laws of 1981, Chapter 16, Section 13. A review of the 
Legislative history of that 1981 enactment of the law upon 
which Respondent relies, shows that Section 7-15-1, et seq.# 
was enacted by Senate Bill 134, which is the Financial 
Institution Act of 1981. Further research of the Legislative 
history reveals that there was no recorded comment or floor 
debate or discussion of this particular Section of the Bill, 
and, that the Section in question passed on March 12, 1981, 
to be effective on July 1, 1981, and was simply tacked onto 
the Financial Institution Act of 1981 without comment. If 
the Legislature had intended to legislate around the holding of 
the Howells case, supra., there would have been some comment 
regarding the reasons for limiting or eliminating the result 
of the Howells holding under the Howells facts. 
The Howells case clearly carves out an exception to the 
purported strict liability of the Section 7-15-1(1). The 
1981 legislation changing 7-15-1(1) does not alter the Howells 
fact situation. To allow the Section 7-15-1(1) interpretation 
of the Howells facts (identical to the facts of this case) to 
stand by the ruling of the lower Court herein, is to deny 
this Appellant his opportunity to present facts to a trier 
of fact for determination as to his liability in this fact 
situation. Put another way, if the lower Court's ruling that 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 7-15-1(1) is a strict liability 
statute is allowed to stand, then this Appellant is denied 
his right to substantive due process by not allowing him to 
present his facts to a trier of fact for a determination as 
to whether or not he falls, factually, within the exception 
carved by Howells. 
It appears to Appellant that the Legislature, in enacting 
Section 7-15-1(1), has attempted to balance the competing 
interests of the merchant and financial institution as 
against the check writer to lessen the burden upon the 
merchant and financial institution by making the maker of a 
check pay the amount thereupon if such check is dishonored. 
However, the Section 7-15-1(1) enactment goes too far in 
impairing the rights of makers, or, as in this case, the rights 
of corporate co-makers in fact situations wherein this Court 
has stated that the instrument is not an instrument within 
the meaning of the statute. Again, this Appellant has been 
substantively deprived of his right to present his facts to 
a trier of fact for their determination of whether or not 
Appellant is liable to Respondent. 
This Court has stated in Wells v Childrenfs Aid Society 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, at 204-5 (1984): 
Substantive due process concerns 
the content of the rules specifying 
when a right can be lost or impaired. 
This question can arise in the context 
of a hearing where the procedural 
formalities were observed. 
• * * 
(The Court speaking of In re J.P., 
648 P.2d at 1375) 
That holding assumed that the 
judge's hearing met all the 
requirements of procedural due 
process, but concluded that the 
statute was invalid in its 
substantive content, (parenthetical added) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 7-15-1(1) as interpreted 
by the Court below presents a substantive due process 
challenge because it specifies a particular substantive 
rule which impairs Appellant's ability to have his facts 
heard. Facts which have previously been held by this Court 
to take Appellant out of the purview of the very statute 
which denies him his ability to be heard. The substantive 
content of Section 7-15-1(1) creates a statuory presumption 
of liability regardless of the facts presented to the court. 
If a maker were to be forced to sign a bad check at gun point, 
that maker would be held liable for the check under the lower 
Court's interpretation of Section 7-15-1(1) because that maker 
would not be able to get his or her facts before the court. 
Section 7-15-1(1), as interpreted by the lower Court, is a 
strict liability statute that impairs a maker's rights in 
violation of the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 
I, Section 7, by depriving the maker of, and affecting the 
maker's, liberty. As applied to this Appellant, there is no 
rational relationship between the purpose of the statute and 
the deprivation of this Appellant's liberty. 
In this case, as to this Appellant, Appellant signed only 
as an officer of a corporation, yet the Respondent has held 
Appellant personally liable, with no evidence being presented 
to Court or jury as to whether or not the corporation or the 
the other signatory has been made to pay the obligation. 
The Statute on fraudulent checks as set forth in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 7-15-1(1) is invalid, as it is, 
in substance, in violation of this Appellant's due process 
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution of The State of Utah, 
Article I, Section 7. 
It follows that if the above cited statute is invalid 
as to this Appellant because of its substantive due process 
defects, then the award of attorney's fees to Respondent 
based upon Section 7-15-1(3) is also inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below did not take into account the holding of 
the Howells case which had facts on point with the facts of 
the instant case. The facts of the instant case take the 
"instrument" signed by Appellant out of the purview of the 
statute upon which Respondent relies. 
The Statute, Utah Code Annotated, Section 7-15-1(1) and 
the attorney fee matter in Section 7-15-1(3) are rendered 
invalid as applied to this Appellant due to the statutes 
substantive due process defects. 
This Court should remand the case to the District Court 
for trial of the factual issues consistant with the holding 
in the Howells case, otherwise this Appellant's right to 
due process has been violated. 
Dated this 15th day of September, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorney for) Appellant 
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